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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Is Summary Judgment in favor of Hood precluded by Hood's 
failure to show the non-existence of material issues of fact and 
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
A. Did Hood have the burden on its Motion for Summary 
judgment to show there were no material issues of fact and that 
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
B. Does the record on this appeal include the facts 
from the depositions referred to and set forth in the affidavit 
and memoranda submitted by Salt Lake City? 
C. Does the record on this appeal establish the 
existence of material issues of fact and that Hood was not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
II. Did the District Court err in refusing to reconsider 
Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
III. Did the District Court err in Holding Salt Lake City 
to a higher standard than other litigants in this matter? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hood contends in its Brief that Salt Lake City Corporation 
("SLCC") carried the burden of proving its alter ego claim and 
failed to satisfy this burden when Hood moved for summary 
judgment. Established principles of law governing summary 
judgment, however, places the burden on the party moving for 
summary judgment to establish (1) the non-existence of material 
issues of fact and (2) that the movant is entitled to judgment as 
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a matter of law. Hood failed to meet these prerequisites to the 
granting of summary judgment in its favor. 
Hood further contends, for the first time on appeal, that 
the Court should not consider the depositions taken in this 
matter or the facts therein which were presented before the Court 
and set forth in the Affidavit, (R. 153-60), and Memorandum, (R. 
227-49), submitted by SLCC. All these matters, however, were 
brought to the attention of and were considered by the District 
Court and are part of the record for consideration by this Court 
on appeal. Furthermore, Hood raises this issue for the first 
time on appeal and has waived any objection to the consideration 
of these matters by choosing not to object in the District Court. 
The facts set forth and referred to in the Affidavit and 
Memorandum establish many of the factors determinative of SLCC's 
alter ego claim and create material factual issues precluding 
summary judgment. Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which 
involves general standards adaptable to meet the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case. SLCC's submissions 
establish many of the standard factors considered in weighing an 
alter ego claim and require a trial of the facts and 
circumstances of this case in order to properly dispose of this 
matter. In fact, these facts are so substantial as to 
conclusively establish that Hood is not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Finally, Hood contends that SLCC was properly held to higher 
standards than other parties simply because it is a governmental 
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entity. This argument is contrary to established principles and 
no authority exists supportive of Hood's contention. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HOOD'S FAILURE TO SHOW THE NON-EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF FACT AND THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS 
FAVOR. 
When Hood moved for Summary Judgment it had the burden of 
establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact and 
that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SLCC's 
Affidavit and Memorandum submitted to the District Court, 
however, established, through facts obtained in depositions taken 
in this matter, that material issues of fact do exist and that 
Hood is not entitled to judgment. These matters submitted to the 
District Court, contrary to Hood's contention raised for the 
first time on appeal, are part of the record for consideration by 
this Court. 
A. Hood had the Burden on its Motion for Summary Judgment to 
Show there Were No Material Issues of Fact and that It Was 
Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
Hood suggests in its brief that SLCC failed to adequately 
respond to Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment and failed to make 
a showing sufficient to establish its theory of Alter Ego. 
Furthermore, on page 13 of its brief, Hood states that the 
Summary Judgment should not have been reconsidered because "a 
second trial at the District Court level on the same factual 
issues was not warranted". These contentions fail to recognize 
the standard that a motion for summary judgment is not a "trial" 
3 
of the facts and that the moving party has the burden of 
establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact and 
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Thus, on a Motion for Summary Judgment the 
movant has the burden of showing conclusively 
that there exists no genuine issue of 
material fact and the evidence together with 
all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be 
read in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion. 
Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2nd 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1979). 
With respect to Hood's Argument that SLCC failed to 
adequately respond to its Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
following language of the Sixth Circuit is dispositive. 
A party is never required to respond to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in order to prevail since the burden 
of establishing the non-existence of a material factual 
dispute always rests with the movant. 
Id. at 60 (Citing Adickes v. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157, 
158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). As discussed in 
SLCC's Brief on this appeal, Hood failed to meet this burden. 
Hood's attempt to now shift this burden to SLCC is unwarranted. 
B. The Record on this Appeal Includes the Facts From the 
Depositions Referred to and Set Forth in the Affidavit and 
Memorandum Submitted by Salt Lake City. 
In response to Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment, SLCC 
submitted an Affidavit setting forth verbatim excerpts from the 
deposition of Hood's president demonstrating the existence of 
material issues of fact and that Hood was not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. (R. 153-160). SLCC also submitted, 
in support of its Motion to Reconsider, a Memorandum setting 
forth at length facts supportive of the alter ego claim with page 
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references to the depositions in this matter. (R. 227-249). 
These matters were all brought to the attention of, and were 
considered by, the District Court without objection from Hood. 
When a memorandum sets forth facts from depositions, such 
matters are properly before the court and are part of the record 
on an appeal from a summary judgment. Henderson-Rubio v. May 
Department Stores Company Co. 53 Or.App. 575, 632 P.2nd 1289 
(1981). The Affidavit set forth verbatim excerpts from the 
deposition of Hood's president supportive of the alter ego claim. 
SLCC's Memorandum set forth additional extensive facts probative 
of the alter ego claim with page references to depositions taken 
in this matter. All these facts were presented to the District 
Court and may properly be considered by this Court in reversing 
the summary judgment. Henderson-Rubio v. May Department Stores 
Company Co., 53 Or.App. 575, 632 P.2nd 1289 (1981). 
Hood apparently now acknowledges that the facts set forth in 
the Affidavit and Memorandum from the depositions of Hood's 
employees raise material issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. In order to escape the impact of these facts, Hood now 
contends that this Court should not consider these depositions or 
the facts presented to the District Court. The three cases cited 
by Hood in support of this position: Reliable Furniture Company 
v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 380 P.2d 
135 (Utah 1963); Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1963); Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 1962), are 
all distinguishable from the circumstances of the case at hand. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, referring to these three cases stated in 
Bawden and Associates v. Smith. 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982): 
The authorities cited by appellant on this point are 
distinguishable on their facts. They all involved 
refusals by this Court to consider depositions on 
appeal which were never before the trial court nor 
offered to supplement the record under Rule 75(h). 
Id. at 713 (Emphasis added). In the present case, the facts from 
the depositions were set forth in SLCC's Memorandum and Affidavit 
and were submitted to the District Court prior to this appeal. 
Equally significant is the fact that Hood chose not to 
object in the District Court to consideration of any of the 
matters set forth in the Affidavit or Memorandum and raises these 
issues for the first time on appeal. In Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held in such a case, that any defects or objection 
to the consideration of such matters on appeal from a summary 
judgment are waived: 
In arguing that summary judgment should not have peen 
granted, appellants assert that Franklin's supporting 
affidavits were defective because they were not based 
on personal knowledge, they contained inadmissible 
conclusions of law, and they referred to documents that 
were not attached. However, it is axiomatic that 
matters not presented to the trial court may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, if, 
on a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party 
fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is 
deemed to have waived his opposition to whatever 
evidentiary defects may exist. In the instant case, 
the sufficiency of Franklin's affidavits was not 
challenged in the trial court, and therefore that issue 
is not properly raised here. 
Id. at 1044. Assuming, arguendo, that the facts from the 
depositions were objectionable, which has been seen not to be the 
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case, Hood failed to object to the consideration of the facts set 
forth in the Affidavit and Memorandum, and is deemed to have 
waived any such objection. 
In Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Company, Inc. 609 P.2nd 
15 (Alaska 1980), the lawyer defending against a Motion for 
Summary Judgement submitted his own affidavit setting forth 
statements allegedly made by others. Although the affidavit 
could have been excluded from consideration by the trial court, 
the court on appeal held: 
... it does not appear from the record that 
Nabors ever specifically objected to this 
affidavit, consequently the defects may be 
treated as waived. 
Id.22; Auto-Drive-Away Company of Hialea, Inc. v. Icce, 360 F.2nd 
446, 448-49 (5th Circuit 1966). 
The facts presented to the District Court in the Affidavit 
and Memorandum were properly before the Court and are part of the 
record on this appeal. Hood's objection to consideration of 
these matters is without basis. Even if this were not the case, 
Hood chose not to object to the consideration of these matters 
and has waived any objection to such consideration. This is 
especially true when the technical defects complained of by Hood 
regarding filing of the depositions were matters in Hood's 
control since all but one of the depositions relied upon were of 
Hood employees and the originals to be filed were in the 
possession of Hood's attorneys. 
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C. The Record on this Appeal Establishes the Existence of 
Material Issues of Fact and that Hood was Not Entitled to 
Judgment as a Matter of Law, 
As discussed in SLCC's brief on this appeal, the Affidavit 
and Memorandum submitted by SLCC established the existence of 
material issues of fact regarding the alter ego claim. Hood, 
however, vigorously disputes SLCC's contention that the facts, 
undisputed or disputed, support SLCC's alter ego claim. This 
dispute as to the consequence and meaning of the facts in this 
matter itself raises a material factual issue and precludes 
summary judgment. 
Herein although the parties were not in 
complete conflict as to certain facts, the 
understanding, intention, and consequences 
of those facts were vigorously disputed. 
These matters can only be resolved by trial. 
Sandbera v. Cline. 576 P.2nd 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978). SLCC 
contends that the matters in the Affidavit and Memorandum 
establish its alter ego claim. Hood disputes this conclusion. 
Where the impact and consequence of the matters set forth in the 
affidavit is disputed, material issues of fact exist which "can 
only be resolved by trial." 
In Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan, 596 P.2nd 1093 
(Utah 1979), the court set forth the general standard for finding 
Alter Ego: 
There must be such unity of interest and 
ownership that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist, vis., the corporation is, in fact, the 
Alter Ego of one or a few individuals; and 
the observance of the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. 
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Many factors are considered in determining whether the above 
circumstances are met: Colman v. Colman. 67 Utah Adv.Rep. 7 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
SLCC's Affidavit set forth verbatim excerpts from the 
deposition of Hood's president establishing the existence of the 
"unity of interest" discussed in Norman such as: Hood owned 100% 
of the stock in James; Hood advanced substantial amounts of funds 
to James which were not loans and involved no repayment terms; 
Hood guaranteed substantial loans made in behalf of James, one in 
the amount of $300,000.00; and the president and the financial 
officer of Hood were intimately involved in determining the 
financial structure of James. The Affidavit further set forth 
matters suggesting that James was inadequately capitalized, that 
James was treated as a department or division of Hood, and that 
Hood did not abide by the normal corporate formalities. 
In its Memorandum, SLCC set forth additional facts such as: 
When Hood acquired James, it placed James Foreman, a long-time 
Hood employee, as an officer of James. (James Foreman Dep., p.p. 
5-6, R. 365); Foreman acted as Hood's representative while an 
officer of James and was paid his salary by Hood. (Foreman Dep., 
p. 7, R. 3 65). All these factors in the Affidavit and Memorandum 
indicate that James and Hood should be treated as one, rather 
than separate entities. Fish v. East, 114 F.2nd 177, 191 (10th 
Circuit 1940); Intern. U. , United Auto., etc. v. Cardwell MFG. 
Co., 416 F• Supp 1267 (D. Kansas 1976) ; Cruttenden v. Mantura, 
97 New Mexico 432, 640 P.2nd 932 (1982). 
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Hood also argues that there is no evidence that James does 
not comply with corporate formalities. In James Answer to SLCC1's 
First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 77, James admits 
that it has kept no formal minutes of any meetings of its Board 
of Directors. 
The second element set forth in Norman, injustice or an 
inequitable result, is also present in this case. SLCC brings 
claims against James Constructors in excess of $2,200,000.00. 
SLCC is informed that James is insolvent and unable to respond to 
any liability which may be imposed in this matter. As a result, 
SLCC stands to suffer a loss of more than 2.2 million dollars in 
excess of what the subject pipe line project should have cost. 
Such circumstances have been held to establish the injustice and 
inequitable result warranting a finding of alter ego. Bernardin, 
Inc. v. Midland Oil Corporation, 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975). 
It is significant to note, that the doctrine of alter ego is 
not, as Hood suggests, subject to rigid standards and elements 
which must be proved. The doctrine of alter ego is an equitable 
doctrine, the application of which depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case. 
More over, the conditions under which the 
corporate entity may be disregarded or the 
corporation be regarded as the Alter Ego of 
the stock holders vary according to the 
circumstances in each case inasmuch as the 
doctrine is an equitable one. 
Shaw V. Bailey-McCune Company, 11 Utah2d 93, 355 P.2nd 321, 322 
(1960). Furthermore, the Court "acting in equity must be allowed 
flexibility to achieve justice", Ulander v. Allen, 544 P.2d 
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1001, 1002 (Colo. App. 1976), and "... it is axiomatic that in 
the realm of equity, no formulation is absolute and no rule is 
without exception.11 Plug v. Wooldridae. 538 P.2d 883, 885 (Colo. 
1975). 
The question oi Alter Ego, therefore, is not susceptible to 
rigid standards or tests, but rather depends upon the 
determination of factual issues regarding the circumstances of 
the particular case involved. In this respect, an alter ego 
claim is similar to a claim of negligence. Just as negligence is 
seldom a proper subject for summary judgment, FMA Acceptance Co. 
v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979), summary 
judgment normally will not be proper on an alter ego claim. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a claim of 
alter ego raises issues of fact, Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Associates, 635 P.2nd 53, 55 (Utah 1981), is matter upon which 
reasonable minds might differ, and involves factual issues which 
are within the prerogative of the court to determine through a 
trial. Chatterlv v. Omnico Inc., 26 Utah2d 88, 485 P.2d 667, 670 
(1971). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECONSIDER 
HOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Affidavit submitted to the District Court, standing 
alone, established the existence :f material issues of fact. 
When SLCC's present counsel filed its Motion to Reconsider Hood's 
Summary Judgment, SLCC presented to the District Court additional 
facts in its Memorandum with page references to the depositions. 
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As previously discussed herein and in SLCC's Brief, these facts 
established the existence of material factual issues regarding 
SLCC's alter ego claim. The District Court was not left with 
unbridled discretion to arbitrarily deny reconsideration of the 
matter in view of these material factual issues. 
In Ottensmeyer v. Baskin, 625 P.2d 1069 (Hawaii 1981), the 
party resisting a Motion for Summary Judgment failed to call to 
the court's attention portions of depositions which raised 
genuine issues of fact. The losing party subsequently moved for 
reconsideration and specified portions of the depositions which 
raised issues of facts. 
On appeal, the moving party contended that the appellate 
court could only consider those depositions specifically brought 
to the court's attention at the time of the first summary 
judgment hearing. The court rejected this contention and held 
that it was "constrained to review the whole record on this 
appeal to see whether or not genuine issues of material fact 
existed." Id. at 1071. In the present case, consideration by 
this Court of the depositions taken in this matter is more 
compelling since, unlike in Ottensmeyer, facts from these 
depositions were brought to the District Court's attention at the 
time the Motion for Summary Judgment was first heard and again at 
SLCC's Motion to Reconsider. See also Higgenbotham v. Quchsner 
Foundation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SALT LAKE CITY TO A 
HIGHER STANDARD THAN OTHER LITIGANTS IN THIS MATTER. 
It is well established that when governmental entities 
participate in litigation, such entities are treated the same as 
any other parties in judicial proceedings. 
It has been the policy of the American as well as of 
the English courts to treat the government when 
appearing as a litigant like any private individual. 
Bank Line v. United States. 163 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1947). SLCC 
has presented, in its Brief previously filed with this court, 
extensive authority in support of this principal. 
Hood disputes the above principle and its application in 
this case to SLCC. In its brief, Hood focuses on two of the 
numerous cases cited by SLCC and argues that since they were not 
factually identical to the present case, the principle of law 
should not apply. Although the cases were not factually 
identical to this case, they are squarely on point relative to 
the legal issue involved and the principal of law enunciated. It 
is further significant to note, that Hood offers no authority 
whatsoever to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
Hood had the burden of establishing the non-existence of 
material issues of fact and to establish that it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Hood failed to meet this burden and 
its attempt to now shift its burden to SLCC is unwarranted under 
the established principles governing summary judgments. Material 
issues exist with respect to SLCC's alter ego claim and such 
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issues require a trial of the facts. The summary judgment in 
favor of Hood, therefore, was improper. 
The existence of the factual issues precluding summary 
judgment in favor of Hood were set forth in the affidavit of 
SLCC's prior counsel at the time Hood's motion was first heard 
and in SLCC's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Reconsideration. All these matters were properly before the 
District Court and are part of the record on this appeal for 
consideration by this Court. Having failed to object in the 
District Court regarding consideration of any of these matters, 
Hood is deemed to have waived any objection to such consideration 
and cannot now raise such objections for the first time on 
appeal. 
Finally, the principle that governmental entities are to be 
treated and held to the same standards as any other litigants in 
judicial proceedings is well established and SLCC was prejudiced 
in this matter when it was held to a higher standard than its 
opponents. 
Dated this \T" day of November, 1987. 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
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STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC. , 
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , ) REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
) C i v i l No. C 84-2857 
v s . ) 
) J u d g e J u d i t h B i l l i n g s 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ) 
D e f e n d a n t s . ) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n of 
t h e S t a t e of U t a h , 
Th i rd P a r t y P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . , 
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , HOOD 
CORPORATION, C a l i f o r n i a 
c o r p o r a t i o n and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
C a l i f o r n i a c o r p o r a t i o n , 
Th i rd P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s , 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS . 
County of Salt Lake) 
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr. being duly sworn deposes and states 
as follows: 
I am the attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, the 
defendant and third party plaintiff in the above consolidated 
action. Third party defendant Hood Corporation has made a Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon the fact that the third party 
defendant is a separate and legal entity and not responsible for 
the debts of their subsidiary corporation James Constructors, 
Inc. 
It is the theory of Salt Lake City Corporation in its 
Complaint that James Constructors, Inc. is nothing, but the alter 
ego of Hood Corporation and as such is not a separate entity and 
that Hood Corporation is responsible for the breach of contract 
by James Constructors, Inc. It is a well known theory of law 
that to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment there needs only to 
be a question of fact for the jury. Salt Lake City Corporation 
respectfully submits that there are many questions of fact for 
the jury and that the question of Hood Corporation's liability 
cannot be determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
leading case which sets down the criteria as to whether a parent 
corporation can be liable for a subsidiary on the basis of the 
theory of alter ego \s Cruttenden v. Mantura, 640 P.2d 932. This 
case cites ten separate criteria that should be looked at by the 
-2-
C\>ur t in d e t e r m i n i n g w t i e t h o r a s u b s i d i a r y in an a l t e r ogo of. a 
p a r e n t c o r p o r a t i o n . I t f u r t h e r goes on t o say t h a t n o t a l l of 
t hese g u i d e l i n e s must be met, but t hese a re only f a c t o r s for the 
t r i a l cou r t to cons ide r in determining whether or not to 
recognize a c o r p o r a t i o n as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y . Examining these 
ten c r i t e r i a i t would seem t h a t t h e r e a re a t l e a s t s ix of the ten 
which would i n d i c a t e t h a t James Cons t ruc to r s was n o t h i n g , taut the 
a l t e r ego of Hood Corpora t ion . The f i r s t c r i t e r i a would be "(1) 
the pa ren t c o r p o r a t i o n owns a l l or a ma jo r i ty of the c a p i t a l 
s tock of the s u b s i d i a r y . " In r e f e r r i n g to the d e p o s i t i o n of Mark 
Laulhere the P r e s i d e n t of Hood Cropora t ion taken on December 13, 
1984 a t page 7 Mr. Laulhere was asked the following q u e s t i o n : 
"And was t h i s an out and out cash purchase? Did 
you purchase a l l of i t , 100% of the s tock in W.C. 
James? 
"Answer: Yes ." 
As can be seen from Mr. Lau lhe re 1 s answer the f i r s t c r i t e r i a i s 
c l e a r l y met in t h a t Hood Corpora t ion owns a l l of the s tock of 
James C o n s t r u c t o r s , I n c . 
C r i t e r i a N o . ( 3 ) t h e p a r e n t c o r p o r a t i o n f inances the 
s u b s i d i a r y . Page 17 of Mr. L a u l h e r e ' s d e p o s i t i o n : 
"Ques t ion : Has Hood Corpora t ion loaned any money 
to James Cons t ruc to r s? 
"Answer: We have advanced funds but we h a v e n ' t 
made s p e c i f i c l o a n s . 
"Ques t ion : Do you have any idea approximately how 
much has been advanced to James? 
"Answer: No I d o n f t . 
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"Quest ion: Do you know the terms of the repayment 
by James to Hood? 
"Answer: We h a v e n ' t e s t a b l i s h e d any terms of 
repayment ." 
Page 18 
"Question: Are you the guarantors of any loans 
that have been made to James? 
"Answer: Yes, 
"Question: Can you give me the approximate amount 
of these loans? 
"Answer: My recollection is that we have just 
guaranteed one loan at First Security Bank in 
Utah. 
"Question: Do you know the amount of that loan? 
"Answer: Originally it was for $300,000. I'm not 
sure of the exact amount. 
"Question: And do you know what the loan was for? 
"Answer: I think it was to pay off some other 
loans and provide working capital." 
Criteria No. (5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate 
capital. As can be seen from the attached Exhibit "A" the 
consolidated statement of operations and return any earnings for 
Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries James Constructors showed a 
net loss for the year 1983 of $36r000. 
Criteria No. (8) In the papers of the parent corporation, 
and in the statements of its officers the "subsidiary" is 
referred to as such or as a department of the division. 
As can be clearly seen from the consolidated financial 
statement of Hood James Contructors is included in the 
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consolidated financial statement and is included as a suosidiary 
of Hood Corporation. 
Criteria No . (9) The directors or executives of the 
subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the 
subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation 
referring once again to the deposition of Mark Laulhere the 
president of Hood Corporation page 36 line 18 through 25. 
"Question: And did you approve both of these 
bonds or these requests for bonding? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: And do you receive periodic repor ts on 
those pa r t i cu l a r jobs as you did on the Salt Lake 
City job.? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: Flow often do you receive repor t s on 
those jobs? 
"Answer: A monthly b a s i s . 
"Question: Do you review James Constructors 
f inancial s t ruc tu re on a monthly bas is also? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: Who does tha t review? 
"Answer: I do with our chief f inancial o f f i c e r . " 
As c lea r ly can be seen James Constructors finances along with 
t h e i r jobs are c lose ly monitored and directed by the of f icers of 
Hood Corporation, the parent corporat ion. 
C r i t e r i a No. (10) The formal legal requirements of the 
subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not 
observed. Once again re fe r r ing to Mr. Laulhere 's deposit ion 
- 5 -
pages 38 and 3 9 : 
"Question: Who performs the audit of James books? 
"Answer: Ernest and Whitney. 
"Question: The same audi tors tha t do yours? 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question: And t h a t ' s a consolidated audit? 
"Answer: Yes. 
As c l ea r ly can be seen James audit i s done by the parent 
co rpora t ion ' s audi tors as par t of the parent co rpora t ion ' s 
consolidated audit and i t i s not an independent and separate 
aud i t . 
I t i s r espec t fu l ly submitted tha t James Constructors Inc. 
was purchased by Hood Corporation solely to have a non-union 
company to do business in the S ta te of Utah and is t o t a l l y 
control led by Hood Corporation. As such i t i s a question of fact 
for the jury to determine at the t r i a l of t h i s action whether or 
not Hood Corporation i s responsible for the debts and breach of 
contrac t of James Constructors and that t h i s motion cannot be 
decided simply on the a f f idav i t of Mr. Laulhere which i s t o t a l l y 
contradicted by h i s sworn testimony in the depos i t ion . 
DATED t h i s 30 day of July 198 5. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this g f ^ day of July, 
1985. 
MyiGompti-ssion E x p i r e s 
a\'-
'
:fe^7K 
N0TAT*7 PUBLIC, r e s i d i n g i n 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I ma i l ed a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g Reply 
A f f i d a v i t t o David A. Reeve , ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST, 1300 
Walker C e n t e r , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 and t o C. Reed Brown, 
4685 S o u t h High land D r i v e , S u i t e 202 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84117 , 
by d e p o s i t i n g t h e same i n t h e U . S . m a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , 
t h i s J ^ ^ - d a y of J u l y , 1 9 8 5 . 
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WILFORD A. BEESLEY #0257 
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City 
Corporat ion 
310 Deseret Book Building 
4 0 Easr South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC. , 
a Nevada corporation; HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION'S MOTION TC 
RECONSIDER AND FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT. 
Civil No. C-84-2857 
Judge Judith Billings 
Salt Lake City Corporation, (SLCC) hereby submits its 
1 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider and for Leave 
to Amend Complaint. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff desires to bring to the attention of the Court the 
following undisputed facts, paragraphs 7 - 2 0 herein, which were 
net before the Court at the time the Court heard defendant Hood 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, which facts establish 
that Hood Corporation is the alter ego of James Constructors and 
is a proper party to this action. 
1. This law suit was commenced on or about May 15, 193 4 
and arose out of a Construction Contract between the parties 
for the construction of a water pipe line for SLCC, known as the 
Big Cottonwood Conduit Extension Terminal/Park Transmission 
Pipeline, Project No. 35-4148. 
2. This matter was originally handled for SLCC by Arthur 
Keesler, Esq., of the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office. In March 
of 1986, however, SLCC turned the case over to Wilford A. 
Beesley, Esq., of the law firm of Beesley, Spencer & Fairclough. 
3. SLCC named defendant Hood Corporation (at times 
hereinafter referred to as Hood) as a defendant in its Complaint 
stating as a cause of action that SLCC awarded the construction 
job to James Constructors, (at times hereinafter referred to as 
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James) in reliance upon information submitted in the form of Hcod 
Corporation's promotional literature. 
4. Hood Corporation made a Motion for Summary Judgement 
requesting a dismissal of SLCC's claim of reliance. Summary 
Judgment was granted by the Court. 
5. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to 
the Court by counsel for Hoed stated that the Summary Judgment 
was granted on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show a 
substantial issue of fact with regard to an alter ego theory of 
liability. 
6. The Alter Ego theory, however, is not in SLCC's original 
Complaint and was not before the Court. SLCCfs original Complaint 
based its claim of liability on the part of Hood upon reliance/ 
estoppel rather than on an alter ego theory. The Memorandum 
submitted on behalf of Hood, in fact, does not even address the 
alter ego theory. No Memorandum was submitted by prior counsel 
on behalf of SLCC. 
FACTS 
SLCC relies upon the following facts in support of its 
motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint: 
7. Hood owns 100% of the stock of James Constructors. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 7). 
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8. Hoed placed James Foreman, one of its long time 
employees, with James Constructors1 predecessor, W.C. James, as 
General Manager and Vice-President prior to Hood's acquisition of 
100% of the stock in said entity. During this period of time 
when James Foreman served as Vice-President and General Manager 
of W.C, James, James Foreman was an employee and representative 
of Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 11; Foreman Dep. p. 7). 
9. When Hood acquired 100% of the stock of James 
Constructors, it placed James Foreman as President of 
James. Hood admitted that this action may have been taken 
directly by Hood's Board of Directors. (Laulhere Dep., p. 12). 
10. Hood advanced funds to James without any repayment 
provisions or security. These advances of funds were not loans. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 17). 
11. Hood has guaranteed loans made by third-parties to 
James, including one in an approximate amount of $300,000.00 from 
First Security Bank. (Laulhere Dep., p. 13). 
12. No security was ever provided by James for money 
advanced or the loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 34). 
13. James Foreman was an employee of Hood for several 
years prior to his placement with James Constructors by Hood 
(James Foreman Dep., pp. 5-6). 
14. When Hood placed James Foreman with James, James 
Foreman did not sever his ties with Hood but rather was acting as 
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the representative of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood. 
(Foreman Dep., p. 7) . 
15. James Foreman provided Hood promotion literature to 
Salt Lake City Corporation in order to aid SLCC in determining 
whether or net to award the pipeline project to James. 
16. Since Industrial Indemnity was Hood's bonding 
company, it was also the bonding company of James 
Constructors. (Foreman Dep., p. 10). 
17. Industrial Indemnity, when bonding James1 projects, 
relied upon Hood and did not ask for financial statements from 
James Constructors and relied upon the financial position of 
Hood. (Foreman Dep., p. 18). 
18. Industrial Indemnity's arrangement, in bonding James 
was to consider the financial position of Hood and its 
subsidiaries as one single account. (Ken Evans Dep., pp.14, 15 & 
32) . 
19. The President of Hood Corporation, Marc Laulhere, 
signed the Indemnity Contract of James Constructors' 
predecessor, W.C. James, as President of Hood. (Evans Dep., p. 
18) . 
20. When a claim arose against James Constructors by 
Staker Paving on the Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, James1 
bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, dealt directly with Marc 
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Laulhere, Presidenr of Hoed Corporation rather than with the 
officers or personnel of James. (Evans Dep., p. 23). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT IS PRESENT IN THIS MATTER AS TO 
WHETHER HOOD IS THE ALTER EGO OF JAMES CONSTRUCTORS. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the original pleadings contain 
no reference to the alter ego theory against hood, Rule 56 (c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes Summary Judgement en 
such a claim where there exists a genuine issue of fact. 
We are of the opinion that there was an issue raised by 
the pleadings and the counter affidavit of the 
defendant in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and that the defendant is entitled to 
have its day in Court. . .Rule 56, U.R.C.P., should not 
be used where there are issues of fact in dispute. 
Hatch v. Suaarhouse Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 
758, 759 (1967). 
The facts obtained in the discovery of this matter and which 
were not before the Court at the hearing of Hood's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, make it "clear that issues of fact are raised 
by the claim [of Alter Ego]." Amiacs Interest, Inc. v.Design 
Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1983). This is particularly 
evident in view of the nature of the alter ego doctrine. 
Moreover, the conditions under which the corporate 
entity may be disregarded or the corporation be 
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regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders vary 
according to the circumstances in each case inasmuch as 
the doctrine is an equitable one... 
Shaw v. Bailev-McCune Company, 11 Utah 2d 93, 355 P.2d 321, 322 
(1960). 
The determination of the alter ego issue, therefore, 
necessarily requires findings of fact in order to determine if 
the circumstances of the particular case warrant a finding of 
altar ego. Such evidentiary findings of facts in dispute, 
however, are not a proper subject for disposition through summary 
judgment. 
[I]n a morion for Summary Judgment, the judge is 
neither required nor permitted to find facts which are 
in issue, he can only find that there are no issues of 
fact to be found and that one party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 464 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1970). Given the equitable and factual nature of an 
alter ego claim, it is apparent that such a claim can 
properly be resolved only through findings of fact after an 
evidentiary hearing or trial and normally is not a proper 
subject for summary Judgment. 
It further appears that the question of alter ego itself is 
an issue of fact and is not properly disposed of through summary 
judgment unless the undisputed facts clearly establish the claim. 
In Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assoc, 635 P. 2d 53 (Utah 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court considered the appeal of a summary 
judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action. In holding that the 
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summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's alter ego claim was not 
proper, the Court stated: 
The District Court made no mention of plaintiff's 
alter-ego claim in its order of dismissal, but it is 
clear that issues of fact are raised bv the claim. 
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
In Plotkin v. National Lead Company, 432 P.2d 323 (Nevada 
1971), the court found that a claim of alter ego presented a 
genuine issue of fact and that summary judgment was improper. In 
that case, the court reversed the granting of summary judgment 
based upon alter ego. 
POINT II 
HOOD FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED SHOWING THAT IT WAS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Summary judgement is only proper where the party who is 
granted the summary judgment has made "a showing which precludes, 
as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the losing 
party." Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 
2d 353, 359 P.2d 18, 19 (1961). Hood must "clearly" show tha~ 
"there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against 
could prevail." Frisbe v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 337, 
3 89 (Utah 1984). Hood Corporation has not even attempted to make 
such a showing with regard to the alter ego theory. The 
Memorandum submitted by Hood Corporation does not mention in any 
way or form the theory of alter ego. 
Furthermore, Hood's only attempt to make the required 
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showing that it was entitled to judgment was the affidavit of 
Marc Laulhere. This affidavit, however, merely states that 
Hood Corporation was a separate corporation from James 
Constructors. Such an affidavit is insufficient for purposes of 
summary judgment and should be disregarded by the Court as 
conclusory and self serving. Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170 
(Utah 1983); Orion Coro v. State, 693 P.2d 1369 (Wash. 1985); 
Searnster v. Rumuh, 698 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1985); Vail Nat. Bank v. J. 
Wheeler Constr. Cort?, 669 P.2d 1038 (Colo.App. 1983). Finally, 
the facts obtained < in the depositions of Hood's officers, 
including Marc Laulhere, and others contradict and dispute the 
statement in the affidavit of Marc Laulhere submitted on behalf 
of Hood Corporation. 
In Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the purpose of summary judgement and 
the conditions under which it may properly be granted. 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure 
to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, 
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it 
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any 
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only 
when it so appears, is the Court justified in refusing 
such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence 
in attempting to persuade the trier to his views. 
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any 
issue,material to the settlement of the controversy, 
the Summary Judgement should not be granted. 
Id. at 193. 
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Hood clearly has not satisfied the above standard. First of 
all, the sworn statements in Mark Laulhere's deposition conflict 
with and create a genuine and material issue of fact with regard 
to the statements in his affidavit. More importantly, however, 
the facts obtained in discovery of this matter preponderate so 
favorably towards a finding of alter ego, particularly when 
viewed in a light most favorable to Salt Lake City Corporation, 
that Summary Judgement cannot properly be granted in favor of 
Hood. As will be discussed below, these undisputed facts are so 
substantial that summary judgment would be more properly granted 
against Hood on the theory of alter ego. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the facts discussed below with regard to the 
altar ego theory were not brought to the attention of the Court 
at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT III 
THE FACTS OBTAINED IN DISCOVERY OF THIS MATTER AND 
WHICH WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AT THE HEARING OF 
HOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT INDICATE THAT HOOD 
CORPORATION WAS THE ALTER EGO OF JAMES CONSTRUCTORS AND 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FAVOR OF HOOD WAS IMPROPER. 
The facts obtained in the discovery if this matter as of the 
date of this Motion not only create genuine issues of fact 
regarding the alter ego theory, they also yield such substantial 
and undisputed facts on this point that summary judgment would be 
more properly granted in favor of Salt Lake City Corporation on 
the issue of alter ego. 
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A. The Alter Ego Doctrine, 
The Doctrine of alter ego may be used in appropriate 
circumstances where stockholders of a corporation use the 
corporation as a shield to avoid debts or other obligations. 
Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973). The 
Utah Supreme Courr discussed the requirements of the alter ego 
doctrine in Norman v Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, 59 6 
P.2d 1023 (Utah 1979). 
In order to disregard the corporate entity,there must 
be a concurrence of circumstances: (1) There must be 
such unity of interest in ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, vis., the corporation is, in fact, the 
alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the 
observance of corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice or inequitable result would follow. 
Id. at 1030; See also Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 800 F.2d 853, 
859 (9th Cir. 1986) . Furthermore, the Courts will look beyond 
the corporate veil where the corporate entity is used to defeat 
justice or where the corporate entity is "but a sham11 and it is 
the stockholder who is doing business behind the corporate 
shield. Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 
(1973). 
Furthermore, the use of the corporate veil to avoid legal 
obligations is not favored, Jory v. Benniqht, 542 P.2d 1400 
(Nevada 1978)(citing Banaor Punta Operations v.Bangor A.R. 
Company, 417 U.S. 703 (1974)), and a court of equity will give 
greater deference to the substance rather than the form of an 
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entity. Decker v. Berean Baptist Church, 51 Or.App. 191, 624 
P.2d 1094 (1981); Linson v. Linson. 1 Hawaii Ct. App. 272, 613 
P.2d 748 (1980); Carol v. Board of Education Trustees, 593 P„2d 
649 (Arizona 1979) . 
A Court of Equity looking beyond the mere form of 
things to their substance, has power to decree such 
relief to the parties as appears just and right, and is 
best calculated to protect their rights under the 
situation presented by the record. 
Sinclair Oil and Gas Ccmoanv v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436, 448 (Okla. 
1967). The undisputed facts in this matter strongly indicate 
that James was not a separate entity independent of Hood but 
rather was the alter ego of Hood and that, therefore, summary 
judgment in favor of Hood was improper. 
B. Unity of Identity and Lack of Seoarateness of Hood and James. 
In Steven Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 
(7th Cir. 1963) , The Court outlined several relevant factors in 
determining whether the doctrine of alter ego is applicable in 
any particular case. Among the factors enumerated are several 
factors which have been established in this case: 
(a) The parent owns all or most of the capital stock of 
the subsidiary... 
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary... 
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the 
capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise its 
incorporation... 
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other 
expenses or losses of the subsidiary... 
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do 
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not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary 
but take their orders from the parent corporation in 
the latterfs interest. 
Id. at 161• Among these factors are several which have been 
established by the discovery in this matter-
When James Constructors dealt with its bonding company, 
Industrial Indemnity, for bonding on construction projects, 
Industrial Indemnity had only one account covering both Hood 
Company and James Constructors. (Evans Dep. pp., 14, 15, & 32). 
Hood and James were considered by Industrial Indemnity to 
be one single account. (Evans Dep. pp., 14, 15, & 32). 
In fact, when handling the bonding for James Constructors, the 
financial position of James Constructors was not considered 
by Industrial Indemnity but rather only the financial 
position of Hood. (Evans Dep., pp. 14, 15 & 32; Foreman Dep., p. 
18) . 
Furthermore the bonding documents for James and its 
predecessors were signed by Marc Laulhere as President of Hood. 
(Evans Dep., p. 18). When James Foreman was asked why Industrial 
Indemnity Company was chosen for James Constructors he stated 
that Industrial was James Constructors bonding company because 
that is who bonded Hood. (Foreman Dep., p. 10). 
The unity of interest and lack of separateness of Hood and 
James's is further evidenced by their operations. In 1983, Hood 
placed one of its long time employees, James Foreman with 
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James Constructors' predecessor. (Foreman Dep., pp. 5 & 7). For 
a period of approximately one year, James Foreman acted as the 
General Manager and Vice-President of the predecessor of James 
Constructors. (Foreman Dep., p. 7). When Foreman was placed by 
Hoed with James he was the representative of Hood and did not 
sever his ties with Hood and Hoed paid his salary. (Foreman 
Dep., p. 7). Hood acquired 100% of the stock in James 
Constructors1 predecessor, changed the name to James Constructors 
and placed James Foreman as President. (Laulhere Dep., p. 12). 
When bidding for the SLCC project, James Foreman supplied Hood 
promotion literature' to Salt Lake City Corporation in order to 
induce SLCC to award the pipeline project to James Constructors. 
The financial dealings between Hoed and James further 
evidences a unity of identity. Hood guaranteed large loans taken 
out by James Constructors, one of which was in the amount of 
$300,000.00 from First Security Bank. (Laulhere Dep., p. 18). No 
security or protection was given to Hood on this guarantee. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 34). In effect, Hood and James acted as one 
in taking out this loan. 
Additionally, Hoed advanced funds to James which were not 
loans. (Laulhere Dep., p. 17). These funds were merely given to 
James without any pay-back requirement or security given. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 17). These transactions amount to nothing 
more than dealings of one entity with respect to its own funds 
transferred from one account to another of the single entity. 
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The lacJc of separateness and unity of identity of Hood and 
James is a7 Q^ 
^so apparent from the manner in which disputes of 
James Const-T,~+. 
U C w Q r s v e r e
 bandied, when a dispute on the Salt 
•^ciJce ci *-
p .
 P l ? S L i n e
 Pr°Uct arose between James and staJcer 
aVZng
'
 t h e
 bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, dealt with 
Ware Laulhe>-e ^ 
- , tne President of Hood rather than with the 
P e r S C n n e l
 Barnes. (Evans Dep., p.
 22) . 
Seed's ownership of 100% of the stocJc in James Constructor 
Hood
*s suhsid^ina *„<* *• 
*xng and financing of James Constructors, James 
constructor'^ i«»^ 
n a d e g u a t e
 capitalization, and Hood's payment of 
t i e
 salary of
 T, J a m e s F
°reman while acting as Vice-President 
f anager of James Constructors predecessor are all 
s supporting a conclusion that James was Hood's alter ego. 
These facts al * • 
S
°
 l n d l c a t e and raise and inference that the 
or executives of James Constructors do not act 
1 n d e p e n d e n t l _ 
,,
 le l n t erest of James Constructors but taJce 
their orders f 
t
 m
 H o o d w h i c h
 would further indicate that Hood is 
alter ego
 Cf James Constructors. 
"Ti^rg^-^fe^g-.of Hood and JaniPs as Separate Entities Would 
^ust2i agfflutable Rpg„if ^nd D e f e a t t h e I n terests of 
econd factor in the alter ego theory as set forth by 
he Utah <? 
Preme Court in Norman v Murray First Thrift and Loan 
^S2any,
 5 9 6 p 
•2d 1028 (Utah 1979), that the recognition of 
•Parate entit' 
ies would yield an inequitable result, is also 
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present in this case. Hood acquired James to do business in the 
State of Utah behind the corporate shield of James Constructors. 
As discussed above, Hood ran and operated James Constructors 
through its own officers and by placing its own personnel in 
supervisory and management positions. Hood maintained and 
financed James through guaranteeing loans and supplying cash at 
an undercapitalized level with equity of only 25% of its 
liabilities. (Foreman Dep., p. 13). When James Constructors bid 
for the Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, the required bond on 
the project of $1.2 million dollars was essentially obtained by 
Hoed Construction. 
SLCC now brings claims against the parties for damages in 
excess of 2 million dollars. Given the capitalization level at 
which Hood maintained James, it is unlikely that it would be able 
to satisfy any judgment against it. It would be inequitable to 
allow Hood to escape the liability for what are essentially its 
own dealings and obligations by hiding behind the guise of James 
Constructors. Hood Construction should be held to be the alter 
ego of James Constructors and should be held liable for any 
liabilities arising out of Salt Lake City's claims where it was 
really Hood "who is doing business behind the corporate shield'1 
of James Constructors. Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 
510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973). 
In view of the above, Salt Lake City Corporation 
respectfully submits that there exist several material facts 
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supporting a finding that Hood Construction is the alter ego of 
James Constructors. The mere statement in Marc Laulhere's 
affidavit is clearly insufficient in view of these facts to 
constitute the required showing that "when upon any view taken of 
the facts as asserted by [Salt Lake City Corporation, that it] 
would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Company v.Adams, 542 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
In Frisbe v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984), 
the Court stated: 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary Judgment is proper only where 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. It should be granted only when it clearly appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that the party 
moved against could prevail. 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. 
Id. at 389 (emphasis added). In view of the undisputed facts now 
before the Court, there is certainly at least a "reasonable 
probability" that SLCC may prevail on its alter ego claim if 
afforded its day in court to present such claim to the jury. 
This is particularly so since additional facts bearing on this 
issue are sought by SLCC through discovery, the answers and 
responses to which, as of the date of this Memorandum, have not 
yet been received by SLCC and are long overdue. 
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POINT IV 
THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PREVIOUSLY GRANTED IN THIS CASE IN FAVOR OF HOOD 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that : 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action whether it was a claim, counterclaim, 
crossclaim, or third-party claim and/or when multiple 
parties are involved the court may direct entry of 
final judgement as to one or more but fewer than all 
the claims or parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of Summary Judgment. In the absence of such a 
determination and direction any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate that 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the 
parties. 
(Emphasis added). In this case there are multiple parties and 
summary judgment has been granted in the favor of only one of 
those parties. The last sentence of the above Rule of Civil 
Procedure makes clear that the Order granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of Hood Construction is subject to revision or modification 
by this Court at any time before final judgment is entered with 
regard to all parties and all claims in the above entitled 
action. See also Johnson v.Johnson, 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983). 
In Klowser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1974), 
the defendant was granted summary judgment on the question of 
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whether it was per se liable under the facts of that case. in 
considering the legal affect of the judgment, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court explained that a decision upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment can be revised by the trial court at any time pending 
trial because it was not a true final order. See also, Barnett v. 
Cal M, Inc., 445 P.2d 974 (N.M.1968). 
Rule 54 (b) , U.R.C.P., provides for reconsideration and 
reserves in the Court, the power and authority to revise any 
Orders by it in a matter prior to a final decision and Order 
disposing of all parties and all claims. Once the matter is 
brought to the Court's attention, the above Rule and authorities 
clearly show that the Court may reconsider, revise or modify the 
Order. 
POINT V 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION SHOULD BE GRANTED LEAVE TO 
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO NAME HOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
AS A DEFENDANT AND TO PROPERLY PLEAD THE ALTER EGO 
THEORY. 
A. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted in the Interests of Justice. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a 
party may amend its pleading with leave of the Court and that 
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires". The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "....Rule 15 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting of leave 
1Q 
to amend..." Westlev v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 
94 (Utah 1983). In view of the facts discussed above in this 
Memorandum, it appears that justice would require leave to amend 
SLCC's Complaint to plead the alter ego theory and name Hood a 
defendant. 
Hood was originally named as a defendant in the Salt Lake 
City Complaint from the date it was first filed although Hood was 
granted Summary Judgement. The above discussion in this 
Memorandum, however, which was not presented to the Court at the 
time of the Motion of Summary Judgment indicates that the Summary 
Judgment granted should be revised and that Hoed should remain in 
this law suit to allow SLCC to present its evidence at the trial 
of this matter with regard to the alter ego theory. 
It is important to point out that this is not a new cause of 
action and Hood is, in reality, not a new party to the matter 
although it presently is not active in the suit. Hood's 
attorneys remain on the mailing list of all pleadings and 
documents in this case and is not an unrelated party due to its 
unity of identity with James Constructors. 
B. Hood is a Necessary Party Requiring Joinder in This Case. 
As the alter ego of James Constructors, Kcod is a necessary 
party requiring joinder under Rule 19 which requires that 
"persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be 
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joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants." In view of 
the facts indicating the unity of identity and interest of Hood 
and James, leave to amend and join Hood should be granted to 
insure that all necessary parties are in this law suit. 
In the Utah Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the 
rule requiring joinder as a condition to suit is to guard against 
the entry of judgments that might prejudice the rights of such 
parties in their absence and to foster judicial economy through 
preventing multiple litigation. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P. 2d 758 
(Utah 1984); San Pete County, etc. v. Price River etc., 652 P. 2d 
1302, 1306 (Utah 1982). Hoed will certainly be affected by any 
judgment against James Constructors due to its unity identity 
with James and further due to the fact that James Constructors 
bonding was secured by Hood. Furthermore, if Hood is not joined 
in this law suit then there exists the possibility of additional 
law suits against Hood for any judgment rendered against James in 
this action. 
In order to comply with the provisions of Rules 15 and 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Salt Lake City Corporation 
should be granted leave to amend its Complaint to join Hood and 
to plead the theory of alter ego. 
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CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts now before the Court and which were not 
presented to the Court at the time of the Motion of Summary 
Judgment, when viewed in a light most favorable to Salt Lake City 
Corporation, support a cause of action against Kood on the alter 
ego theory. It certainly cannot be said that there is no 
reasonable probability that Salt Lake City Corporation could not, 
under any view of the facts, prevail on its claim of alter ego. 
At the very least, these facts create a genuine and substantial 
disputed issue of fact with regard to the issue of alter ego. In 
view of these facts which were not before the Court when this 
Motion was heard, the Summary Judgment should be withdrawn and 
Salt Lake City Corporation should be afforded its day in Court 
to present its evidence on the issue of alter ego to the jury. 
If Salt Lake City Corporation is not allowed to have its day 
in Court on the issue of alter ego, a great injustice will result 
inasmuch as Hood Corporation will be allowed to escape Salt Lake 
City's claims in excess of $ 2 million through its operations in 
the State of Utah under the guise and shield of James 
Constructors. The law does not favor such use of a corporate 
shield. Salt Lake City Corporation respectfully requests that 
this Court act within its authority in withdrawing the Summary 
Judgment which has been granted and further to grant Salt Lake 
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City Corporation leave to amend its complaint to rejoin Hood and 
to plead the alter ego theory. 
Dated this grTday of December, 1986. 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
Wilford A. Beesley 1 
Pv^^k. 
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